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Explanation has been a central feature of AI systems for legal reasoning since their
inception. Recently, the topic of explanation of decisions has taken on a new urgency,
throughout AI in general, with the increasing deployment of AI tools and the need for
lay users to be able to place trust in the decisions that the support tools are recom-
mending. This paper provides a comprehensive review of the variety of techniques for
explanation that have been developed in AI and Law. We summarise the early contri-
butions and how these have since developed. We describe a number of notable current
methods for automated explanation of legal reasoning and we also highlight gaps that
must be addressed by future systems to ensure that accurate, trustworthy, unbiased de-
cision support can be provided to legal professionals. We believe that insights from AI
and Law, where explanation has long been a concern, may provide useful pointers for
future development of explainable AI.
1. Introduction
The English essayist Charles Lamb famously wrote “He is no lawyer who cannot
take two sides”. For many, the same is true of AI and Law programs. Arguing for
just one side, or worse simply pronouncing for one side, is not enough. To make a
convincing case in court, one must be able to offer reasons for one’s own side, and
to anticipate and rebut arguments for the other side. The first important AI and Law
program, TAXMAN [86], set out to reconstruct the arguments of the majority and
minority opinions in the famous tax case of Eisner v Macomber1 In TAXMAN, there
was no interest in assessing and deciding between the two opinions: the purpose was
simply to be able to argue for both sides. The point is that the outcome of a case is
often not clear: in any serious legal dispute there are opposing arguments, and very
often opinions differ as to who has the better of it. Decisions are reversed on appeal,
and may be reversed again at the highest level of appeal. Even at the highest level,
1Eisner v Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) was a case concerning the tax liability of a stock dividend paid
in the form of additional shares. The majority (5-4) found in favour of Mrs Macomber.
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where the most gifted lawyers are the judges, consensus is, as in Eisner, far from
invariable: an article in the Washington Post2 stated
“According to the Supreme Court Database, since 2000 a unanimous deci-
sion has been more likely than any other result — averaging 36 percent of
all decisions. Even when the court did not reach a unanimous judgment,
the justices often secured overwhelming majorities, with 7-to-2 or 8-to-1
judgments making up about 15 percent of decisions. The 5-to-4 decisions,
by comparison, occurred in 19 percent of cases”.
Although this article was in fact arguing that consensus was the norm, the results still
indicate disagreement in the significant majority of cases, and the narrowest of ma-
jorities in nearly a fifth of cases. Consensus may be the most likely result of the ten
possible (the quorum is 8), but disagreement remains far more likely, and 5-4 the sec-
ond most likely result. Given that even the most expert people can disagree, it would
not be reasonable to accept a judgement from a machine unless backed up with con-
vincing reasons.
In recent years there has been some research directed towards the prediction of case
outcomes using algorithms applied to large data sets (e.g. [5] and [88]), but for most
of its history AI and Law has been far more interested in modelling the reasoning to
explain the outcome (and to offer reasons for alternative possible outcomes) than in
predicting the outcome itself. AI and Law therefore offers an interesting area in which
to explore methods for the explanation of AI programs3, as advocated in the most
recent Presidential Address to the International Association for AI and Law [129]. In
this paper we will review a number of approaches. Before we do so, however, we will
consider some general points about explanation, especially in law.
1.1. Right to Explanation
Apart from the centrality of argumentation to legal reasoning, the intellectual chal-
lenge of modelling legal reasoning and the availability of, in the form of opinions on
cases, a large volume of examples, there is another important reason why explanation
is vital for artificial intelligence applied to law. This is the right to explanation [54].
In a legal dispute there will be two parties and one will win and one will lose. If jus-
tice is to be served, the losers have a right to an explanation of why their case was
unsuccessful. Given such an explanation, the losers may be satisfied and accept the
decision, or may consider if there are grounds to appeal. Justice must not only be done,
but must be seen to be done, and, without an explanation, the required transparency is
missing. Therefore explanation is essential for any legal application that is to be used
in a practical setting.
2https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/06/28/those-5-4-decisions-on-the-
supreme-court-9-0-is-far-more-common/ Accessed 13th November 2019.
3The lack of effective explanations is currently a matter of concern for potential end users of AI:
in a 2019 global survey From Roadblock to Scale: The Global Sprint Towards AI, commissioned by
IBM, 83% of global respondents felt that “being able to explain how AI arrived at a decision is uni-
versally important”. See: http://filecache.mediaroom.com/mr5mr_ibmnews/183710/
Roadblock-to-Scale-exec-summary.pdf (last accessed 20th July 2020).
2
1.2. Nature of Explanation
In his recent illuminating survey [90], Miller gives four main findings of features
of explanation. These are:
• Explanations are contrastive. As well as explaining why a particular classifica-
tion is appropriate, a good explanation will also say why other classifications are
not. This is often done using counterfactuals and hypotheticals: “if x had been
true, then the classification would have been A, not B”.
• Explanations are selective. Rarely is a logically complete explanation provided,
but rather only the most salient points are presented unless more detail is re-
quired by the recipient of the explanation. The assumption is that there will be
a considerable degree of shared background knowledge, and so the explanation
need only point to some fact or rule as yet unknown to the recipient.
• Explanations are rarely in terms of probabilities. Using statistical generalisations
to explain why events occur is unsatisfying since they do not explain the gener-
alisation itself. Moreover, the explanation typically applies to a single case, and
so would require some explanation of why that particular case is typical.
• Explanations are social. Explanations involve a transfer of knowledge, between
particular people in a particular situation and so are relative to the explainer’s
beliefs about the explainee’s beliefs.
Miller says that he believes “most research and practitioners in artificial intelligence
are currently unaware” of these features. AI and Law, however, has long recognised
these features, and made them an important part of its approach to explanation.
• Contrastive explanations can be found in legal case based systems such as HYPO
([108] and [7]), quite possibly the most influential of all AI and Law programs
[21]. Indeed the name HYPO is itself short for hypothetical: one of the main
motivations of the system was to explore how the hypothetical variations on cases
would change their outcome. Also there are explanations based on the weighing
of pro and con reasons such as the Reason Based Logic of Hage [69] or the tool
developed by Lauritsen [77].
• Selective explanations were pursued by several AI and Law researchers. Often
this was done through the use of argumentation schemes such as that of Toulmin
[123], used in, for example, [83] and [26]. The idea was to present the key
data items which gave rise to the inference and to suppress things that should
be expected to be already known, such as “John is a man” or “67 > 65”, unless
explicitly requested by the user.
• Probabilities are rarely used in legal decisions. Even where Bayesian reasoning
is used in AI and Law, the explanation is presented not in probabilistic terms
but as scenarios [38], [130] or arguments [121]. A legal decision is supposed to
determine what is true on the facts of the particular case. An 80% probability
would mean that one in five cases would be decided wrongly, which would not
be justice.
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• Legal explanations are inherently social, occurring in the context of courtroom
procedure, and involving an interaction between plaintiff, defendant, judge and,
possibly, jury. This is reflected in the popularity of dialogues as the vehicle of
explanation in AI and Law, such as [71], [61], [16] and [128].
Thus AI and Law provides an excellent domain in which to study explanation of AI
systems. In AI and Law explanation has a long history, is a mandatory feature of fielded
applications in the legal domain, and AI and Law has long recognised the important
facets of explanation identified in [90]. The rest of this paper will be structured as
follows. Section 2 will give an overview of the main types of explanation used in
AI and Law. The various types of explanation will then be described in more detail
in sections 3, 4 and 5. Section 6 will look at interactive explanations, section 7 will
consider efforts to explain machine learning in AI and Law and section 8 will look at
some current research directions that may become influential in the future.
2. Explanation in AI and Law
In its early days, AI and Law followed two main approaches: cased based ap-
proaches such as TAXMAN [86], HYPO [108] and CATO [6], and rule based ap-
proaches including Gardner’s account [57], approaches using production rules [114],
and approaches using logic programming [115]. For some time case and rule based
reasoning were seen as alternatives [35]. Each gave rise to distinctive styles of expla-
nation: case based systems tended to explain by offering precedent cases as examples,
while rule based approaches could offer a trace of the inference process in the manner
of classic expert systems such as MYCIN [46].
2.1. Explanation by Example
The idea of using examples for explanation was pioneered by Rissland in [106] and
[107]. Rissland was originally inspired by the work in mathematics of Lakatos [76],
but soon realised that this technique was also applicable to law [106]. In the Common
Law tradition of the United States, lawyers typically argue by citing precedent cases
which favour their side and distinguishing precedent cases which favour the other side.
Explanation therefore tends to take the form: the case should be decided in this way
because it is like these cases, and unlike these other cases, a form of contrastive expla-
nation, making use of both positive and negative examples. Another idea motivating
[108] was that the explanation would be enhanced by citing hypothetical features of
the case which, had they been different, would have changed the outcome, by making
it sufficiently like an adverse precedent. Example based approaches will be described
in detail in section 3.
2.2. Explanation Using Rules
Although cases are a strong feature of Common Law traditions, laws are paradig-
matically found in statutes. This is especially true of the European tradition of Civil
Law. In many areas, these statutes can be seen as offering definitions of particular
concepts such as murder, benefit entitlement and citizenship. This was exploited in
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[115] which provided a logical formalisation of a piece of legislation which could then
be executed as a logic program. This approach proved highly influential and inspired
several other researchers, including [117] and [73].
As well as logic programs, typically based on formalisations of legislation, there
were some more traditional expert systems, using production rules and based on knowl-
edge elicited from a domain expert such as [114] and [119]. In these systems the rules
often represent sufficient conditions taken from cases and commentaries rather than
definitions taken from statute. All types of rule based system, however, offered their
explanations in the standard expert systems form of the how, why and what-if explana-
tions pioneered by MYCIN [46].
2.3. Hybrid Systems
Some approaches attempted to combine rule and case based reasoning, although
assigning them different roles. The idea was that the law could be described at a high
level in terms of rules, but that determining whether these rules were satisfied by the
facts of a particular case required case based reasoning. This idea was pioneered by
Skalak and Rissland [118] and further developed by Brüninghaus and Ashley [45].
Rule based and hybrid systems will be discussed in section 4.
2.4. Explanation with Reasons: Argumentation
Although all the above AI and Law systems modelled arguments, the explicit use
of computational argumentation has become increasingly popular in AI and Law. Two
developments are particularly significant here: the development of abstract argumenta-
tion [55] and the use of argumentation schemes. At first only the scheme of Toulmin
[123] was used, but later a variety of schemes as advocated by Walton [131] were ex-
plored, e.g. [127] and [100]. The use of argumentation for explanation in AI and Law
will be discussed in section 5.
2.5. Example Cases Used in this Paper
In the following sections we will consider representative examples of the aforemen-
tioned approaches in detail. We will use a running example based on cases involving
the ownership of wild animals (eventually extended to include Popov v Hayashi, which
concerned a disputed baseball [138]). These cases often form part of the introduction
to property law in US Law Schools, and were introduced into AI and Law in [36], since
when they have been widely discussed by a variety of different researchers. A special
issue of AI and Law journal considered different approaches to modelling these cases
[9]. Although a number of cases have been discussed in the literature, we will focus
on the three cases used in [36], which feature in all such discussions. We summarise
the cases to enable appreciation of the differences in the various explanation methods
provided later in the paper.
• Keeble v Hickergill (1707). This was an English case in which Keeble rented a
duck pond, to which he lured ducks, which he shot and sold for consumption.
Hickergill, out of malice, scared the ducks away by firing guns. The court found
for Keeble. Two arguments for Keeble are possible: that he was engaged in an
economically valuable activity, and that he was operating on his own land. The
former reading is adopted in [36], but others, e.g. [31], prefer the latter.
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• Pierson v Post (1805). In this New York case, Post (the plaintiff at first instance)
was hunting a fox with hounds. Pierson intercepted the fox, killed it with a handy
fence rail, and carried it off. The court found for Pierson. The argument was that
Post had never had possession of the fox. The argument that hunting vermin is
a useful activity which needs protection and encouragement formed the basis of
the minority opinion.
• Young v Hitchens (1844). In this English case, Young was a commercial fisher-
man who spread a net of 140 fathoms in open water. When the net was almost
closed, Hitchens went through the gap, spread his net and caught the trapped
fish. The case was decided for Hitchens. The basis for this was that Young had
never had possession of the fish, and that it was not part of the court’s remit to
rule as to what constituted unfair competition.
In our examples we will take Young as the case under consideration and Pierson
and Keeble as the precedents.
3. Explanation through examples: Case Based Reasoning
Although there have been several approaches to reasoning with legal cases, includ-
ing the use of prototypes and deformations [87] and semantic networks [40], by far the
dominant approach has been the use of dimensions and factors [21]. This approach
will therefore be the one considered in detail in this section.
3.1. Dimensions and Factors
A basic principle of common law is that like cases should be treated in a like man-
ner, embodied in the notion of stare decisis (“let the decision stand”); this says that like
cases should be decided in the same way, that previous cases provide precedents to be
followed unless there is a good reason not to, i.e. the current case can be distinguished
from the precedent in some significant way. This raises the question of how it can be
determined whether two cases are sufficiently similar. The facts of the cases are always
rather particular, and may look, at first sight, rather disparate, as we now illustrate.
The famous series of negligence cases discussed by Levi in [79] has cases involving
a loaded gun, a possibly defective gun, mislabelled poison, defective hair wash, scaf-
folds, a defective coffee urn, a defective aerated bottle, a defective carriage, a bursting
lamp, a defective balance wheel for a circular saw, and a defective boiler. In the deci-
sions the items up to the aerated bottle are considered like, and the remainder unlike.
This is because the various objects were not considered as objects in their usual sense,
but according to an attribute they possessed which had legal significance in the par-
ticular situation, namely whether they were imminently dangerous, enabling the list
of items to be split into categories of ‘imminently dangerous’ and ‘latently danger-
ous’. Here imminently and latently dangerous are essentially legal notions, established
through the series of cases. The argument is settled by examining the reasons for at-
tribution in previous cases, not by asking the opinion of native English speakers. This
explains why negligence was found for the first set of items but not the second: these
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items were imminently dangerous. The explanation does not turn on the particular facts
but rather on the legal concept that those facts support.
To capture the above, HYPO [108] and [7], developed the notion of a dimension,
a legally significant aspect of a case representing a range of values starting from the
point most favourable to the plaintiff at one end, and then increasingly favouring the
defendant until the point most favourable to the defendant is reached at the other end.
The facts of the case determine where it should be positioned on the dimension. In the
cases above, the imminence of the danger would be a dimension, and the various items
arranged along it with, perhaps the defective coffee urn the most imminently dangerous
and the defective but unloaded gun the least imminently dangerous of those favourable
to the plaintiff. The pro-defendant items could also be arranged similarly. Now for a
case with a non-defective unloaded gun, one could find for the defendant by explaining
that the gun was not imminently dangerous, although if it had been loaded or defective,
the case would have been found for the plaintiff, a sort of contrastive explanation.
In [6] dimensions were replaced by factors. Factors eliminate the notion of degree
inherent to dimensions so that factors are always simply present or absent in a case,
and always favour one of the two sides. One way of viewing them is a points or ranges
on a dimension, and with a fixed crossover point from plaintiff to defendant imposed
[103]. In [6], cases are represented directly as sets of factors, rather than as sets of facts.
The focus in [6] is on distinguishing: what makes one case significantly different from
another. Factors proved popular and formed the basis of most approaches to reasoning
with legal cases until a recent revival of interest in dimensions [23], [72] and [105]. For
discussions of the relationship between dimensions and factors see [31] and [109].
The explanation in these systems takes the form of a three-ply dialogue. First the
plaintiff cites a case which has the most similarity to the current case of the precedents
favouring the plaintiff. Then the defendant replies by offering counter examples, prece-
dents found for the defendant at least as similar as the case cited for the plaintiff, and
by distinguishing the cited case. Finally the plaintiff attempts a rebuttal, distinguish-
ing the counter examples, and offering reasons why the distinctions are not significant.
The case for the defendant can be made by reversing the roles in the three-ply structure.
Explanations are thus essentially through the presentation of examples, and can be seen
as contrastive, selective and social.
3.2. Application to the Wild Animals Example
Let us now apply this approach to the Wild Animals example introduced above.
We will suppose Keeble and Pierson to be precedents and Young the case under con-
sideration. There are many representations of these cases in terms of dimensions and
factors to choose from, but we will largely follow [109]. They began by listing four
dimensions:
D1 (Control/Possession) concerns control and possession of the game by
the hunter.
D2 (Site) concerns whether the site where the game was taken or pursued
is characterized as public land or private land of the hunter.
D3 (Livelihood) concerns whether the hunter was pursuing the game in
order to make his livelihood or for sport.
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D4 (Competition) concerns the possibility of there being economic com-
petition between the plaintiff and the defendant.
These could form the basis of the factors in [36]. We can simplify D1 into F1
NotCaught, covering all the values of D1 favouring the defendant; Next we split D2
into F2a Private and F2b Public. This is, of course, a simplification of several kinds
of tenure, but the suggestion is that it is whether the land can be seen as the plaintiff’s
own that matters. Similarly D3 can be treated as Boolean, F3 EarningLivelihood, as
can D4, F4 competition,simply favouring the defendant if he is in competition with the
plaintiff.
The cases can now be represented as sets of factors:
Keeble : F1, F2a, F3
Pierson : F1, F2b
Young : F1, F2b, F3, F4
Suppose now we wish to offer Keeble as an example favouring the plaintiff in
Young. We can say:
Where: Plaintiff had not caught the game (F1), and Plaintiff makes his
livelihood from taking game (F3), Plaintiff should win claim. Cite: Kee-
ble.
But this can be rebutted because there are two distinctions so that
Keeble is distinguishable because: In Keeble, the game area is plaintiff’s
property (F2a). This is not so in Young. In Young, plaintiff and defendant
compete (F4). This was not so in Keeble.
The defendant can now offer Pierson as his own precedent to provide a counterex-
ample:
Where: the game is not under plaintiff’s control (F1) and the game area is
open (F2), defendant should win claim. Cite: Pierson.
The plaintiff may now attempt to distinguish Pierson, by saying
Pierson is distinguishable because: In Pierson, the plaintiff was not earning
his living (F3 absent). This is not so in Young.
This, however, can be rebutted, by claiming that F3 is not significant in this case as
its effect is cancelled by the presence of F4.
On this basis, a finding for the defendant seems plausible. Note, however, these
systems do not come to a conclusion as to what the decision should be. They explain
why one might find for the plaintiff and why one might find for the defendant, and allow
the user to choose. Thus in Young, the user decides whether F4 is enough to render F3
insignificant when distinguishing Young from Pierson, and, if so, whether the presence
of F3 is alone sufficient to distinguish Pierson or whether F2a is also needed.
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3.3. Explanation with Dimensions and Magnitudes
Recently there has been a good deal of interest in returning to dimensions or factors
with magnitudes, e.g. [72] and [105]. This enables explanation to be given in terms of
the weighing of pro and con reasons, as found in the Reason Based Logic of Hage [69].
A tool for visual exploration of using different weights for different factors is described
in [77]. Also, a threshold can be set, so that a factor must be present to a sufficient
extent to be deemed worthy of consideration [24]. As well as balancing sets of reasons
for and against a decision, the explanation can be given in terms of a trade-off between
factors. For example privacy and the urgency required for law enforcement in cases
relating to the automobile exception of the US Fourth Amendment [30]. Precedents
can set limits of the degree of trade off permitted, as shown graphically in [23].
4. Step by step Explanation: Rule Based Reasoning
For our example of this style of system we will consider logic programming in the
style of [115], or, as applied to case law, [33]. For case law, this approach requires
that a set of rules be derived from the precedents, encapsulating the knowledge that
they represent. This does, however, require some degree of interpretation on the part
of a knowledge engineer or domain expert. Moreover, the interpretation is subject to
change, and the rules may require reconsideration in the light of new cases (see [79],
[51] and [27]).
We begin by laying down some background knowledge: that ownership of a wild
animal may be established either by owning the land on which it is to be found, or by
taking possession of it through capture.
This gives:
R1 findFor(plaintiff) if capture.
R2 findFor(plaintiff) if ownLand.
We must now define these two concepts. From Pierson we learn from the majority
opinion that bodily possession is certainly sufficient for capture, and having the ani-
mal within one’s control may be sufficient. Since in Pierson the plaintiff had neither
captured the animal nor gained control of it, the issue requires that we make an inter-
pretation. Reading the decision suggests that the stricter position was advocated by the
majority opinion, as so we adopt this.
R3 capture if bodilyPossession.
Turning now to Keeble, we can see that renting the land is sufficient to establish
ownership. A fortiori, actual ownership is also sufficient.
R4a ownLand if owned.
R4b ownLand if rented.
In [36], however, the authors argue that Keeble could also win on capture because
he was in control of the ducks - if not scared away he could shoot them when he pleased
- and was earning his livelihood.
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R3a capture if control and livelihood.
This is consistent with our interpretation of Pierson in R3, since we have the extra
condition. Testing these rules with the query findFor(plaintiff), we get no for Pierson
and true for Keeble. We get no explanation for Pierson. One weakness of this approach
was that the explanation of negatives was not straightforward [28]: the standard how
explanation will state how something has been proved, not how things failed to be
proved. For Keeble, however, we will get an explanation:
I can show findFor(plaintiff) because I can show ownLand.
I can show ownLand because I can show rented.
We also have a second explanation, based on capture:
I can show findFor(plaintiff) because I can show capture.
I can show capture because I can show control and livelihood.
If we now use these rules to determine the outcome in Young, we will get the answer
to the query findFor(plaintiff) as true. If we know the actual outcome was for the
defendant, we will want that explained. This will be the second explanation of Keeble.
Confronted with this, however, an astute defence counsel will note that the fact of the
defendant being in competition with the plaintiff has not been used, and so argue that
R3a should not be followed in this case. This argument was successful, and so R3a
should be modified to:
R3b capture if control and livelihood and not(competition).
This reinterpretation of an existing rule in the light of a new case, fits the mecha-
nism for dynamic case law described in [79] and [27]. With this modification the rules
now find correctly for Young, while still finding correctly for Keeble, where there was
no competition (and also rule 4b applies). However, there is no explanation for the
outcome for the defendant in Young: this outcome is the default which holds when the
plaintiff is unable to satisfy either of the conditions.
Compared with the case based approach, there is more effort required to build the
rule based system. Although both approaches require the identification of the relevant
factors/predicates, the rule based approach has the additional burden of interpreting the
cases to provide a set of rules. Note also, that when the case contains a new factor,
as with competition in Young, which can be used to distinguish the case in the case
based approach, the rules will need to be questioned. Every case has the opportunity
of modifying or extending the rule base [27].
4.1. Conditional Answers and Multiple Solutions
A major difficulty of this style of explanation is that only positive answers can be
explained. In a classical expert system such as MYCIN [46] this was less of a problem.
Firstly such expert systems were often termed consultative: the system was supposed
to have the requisite information and the user was supposed to accept the answers,
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whereas in law we have the right to explanation. Secondly, in MYCIN, the knowledge
itself is more stable: the human body is not subject to radical change, whereas a legal
case always has the power to change the existing wisdom. Thirdly, MYCIN had a large
number of options, so justifying the chosen answer was more sensible, since there was
not a single alternative to explain away. Fourthly, the right to explanation in law [54]
means that the losing party is even more interested in the explanation than the winner.
Some of what was required could be achieved by the use of the what-if query. For
example, one could ask of Young what if competition had been false?. This, however,
required the user to form a hypothesis about why the plaintiff had failed. One approach
proposed to meet these difficulties was the conditional answer approach of [136]. Here
the system suggested ways in which the desired outcome could be made true. So if the
plaintiff in Young were to use the system, he would be told that he would win provided
he had captured the animals (R1). Stepping down he would find that this could be
shown provided that he had been in bodilyPossession (R3) . Since this was not so, an
alternative would be sought, and he would be told that, since he was in control of the
animals and pursuing his livelihood, he would win provided the defendant was not in
competition with him (R5a). Again seeking an alternative, he would be told that he
could win if it was his own land. Since the incident took place on the high seas, Young
will give up here. He will, however, have a thorough understanding of why he did not
win. Note that this explanation has elements of contrastive explanation and of selective
explanation, since the users abandon a line of enquiry once they are satisfied that that
it is of no use to them, as when Young was well aware he was not on his own land.
An approach to problems with the need to make an interpretation was proposed in
[33] and [113]. The idea here was that instead of deciding on a single set of rules,
intended to give a single, putatively definitive, answer, all plausible rules, together with
their source should be represented. For example in addition to the rules above we could
include:
[R3c, [PiersonvPost, minority]] capture if hotPursuit and usefulActivity.
to represent the minority opinion of Livinston in Pierson that the bodily possession
requirement should be relaxed to encourage the socially useful activity of hunting ver-
min. Now this possibility is indicated when the query is run against the facts of Pierson.
Although the rule was rejected when Pierson was heard, it might be that social values
have since changed and the rule could therefore be acceptable to some future court.
This approach thus presents a variety of possibilities which the user must choose
between. Note that here there is no single answer, and no single explanation. Rather
a range of explanations for different outcomes are presented and the user invited to
choose between them. The strategy, as expressed in [33] was:
In applications where we require legal decision support we have proposed
a system of conflicting rules. These rules are designed to present the rel-
evant arguments for and against the conclusion as a basis on which the
user can make his own decision. In the law, questions of open texture are
resolved by the presentation of a case before a judge. The judgement will
be a reasoned decision to accept an argument.
11
Figure 1: Abstract Factor Hierarchy for Wild Animals
4.2. Hybrid systems
The rule based approach had the advantage of structuring the explanation according
to the underlying statute or legal doctrine, but tended to be rather prescriptive and
required considerable knowledge engineering effort in constructing the rule base. In
order to try to get the best of both worlds, some researchers developed hybrid systems.
Examples of such approaches are CABARET [118] and IBP [45].
The idea here was the domain would be described at a high level as a set of general
rules (termed a logical model in [45]). In our example this would comprise R1 and R2,
representing the two routes to establish possession. Factors would now be grouped into
a hierarchy (the abstract factor hierarchy of CATO [6]). Factors are marked “+” or “-”
to show whether they support or oppose the presence of their parent. The hierarchy for
our example is shown in Figure 1. Now explanation of whether or not the leaf nodes
of the logical model are satisfied can be given in terms of the cased based reasoning
of CATO, although only the factors relevant to the particular issue would be included,
thus focusing attention of the aspects relevant to the issue under consideration.
Now the explanation is presented on an issue by issue basis. First capture is con-
sidered:
Where: Plaintiff had not caught the game (F1), and Plaintiff makes his
livelihood from taking game (F3), Plaintiff should win claim on grounds
of capture. Cite: Keeble.
But here the rebuttal, unlike the pure case based system, does not mention land
ownership:
Plaintiff should not win claim on grounds of capture. Keeble is distin-
guishable because:. In Young, plaintiff and defendant compete (F4). This
was not so in Keeble.
On the land ownership issue, the plaintiff has no argument, whereas the defendant
does.
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Where: The game area was not private (F2a absent), Plaintiff should not
win claim on grounds of land ownership. Cite: Pierson.
We will therefore find both issues for the defendant, as was the case in Young.
Where some issues favour one side and others favour the other, as would happen if
we had a case with the facts of Keeble, but with the defendant in competition with the
plaintiff, then we need to rank the issues. What is needed there is to establish that land
ownership has priority over capture. One solution to this was to use the underlying
purposes or values of the law. We will discuss this in the next section.
4.3. Values
In the case based and hybrid approaches and some rule based approaches, such as
the multiple solutions approach, the system presents options but does not offer rea-
sons for choosing between them. Thus, for example, whether Young wins depends on
whether it is accepted that being in competition with Young is sufficient to justify the
defendant’s interference in Young’s pursuit. So the question arises: on what should
these choices be based? An answer was offered in [36], which suggested that the
answer could be determined by a consideration of the social purposes of the law, and
which decision would serve these purposes better. In Pierson they argue that the choice
is between the clarity (and consequently the reduced litigation) that will arise from re-
quiring the very determinate criterion of bodily possession as against the purpose of
encouraging the socially useful activity of hunting vermin that would result from a va-
guer criterion. In Keeble, in contrast, the more relaxed criterion would encourage the
economically useful activity of supplying ducks to the marketplace. According to [36],
this would justify additional litigation where livelihoods were threatened. In Young,
the competition means that economically it does not matter who lands the fish, and so
the court followed Pierson.
This idea was developed in [32], renaming the purposes as social values. This
meant that the explanations could be augmented with the values promoted, and so
inform the choice of the user.
The explanation for Young would now become:
Where: Plaintiff had not caught the game (F1), the game area is public
(F2b) and Plaintiff makes his livelihood from taking game (F3), Plaintiff
should win claim. To promote economic usefulness.
and the rebuttal would be:
In Young, plaintiff and defendant compete (F4). This was not so in Keeble.
Thus economic usefulness is not promoted in Young.
Where: the game had not caught the game (F1) and the game area is public
(F2b), defendant should win claim. To promote clarity of the law.
13
4.4. Theory Construction
Some researchers have argued that reasoning with legal cases should be seen as a
process of theory construction, following the ideas of McCarty [87]. The idea is to
construct a theory which will explain the past cases and determine an outcome for the
current case. The explanation can then be given in terms of the theory, and competing
theories can be evaluated using criteria such as coverage of the past cases, and sim-
plicity, with the simpler theory preferred [51]. One method for theory construction is
given in [102], in which each precedent is modelled as a pair of competing rules, one
for the plaintiff and one for the defendant and a third rule expressing a priority between
these rules according to the outcome of the precedent. This enables the explanation
to include the preferences between rules, and the case or cases which established the
preference. Construction of theories in which rule preferences are explained by prefer-
ences between social values were described in [32]. Construction of these value based
theories using heuristic search was implemented in [50]. An alternative approach to
theory construction using interactive dialogues can be found in [70] and [128].
5. Argumentation Based Explanation
All of the above explanations can be seen as arguments, reasons for adopting the
conclusion. This is natural enough since a legal trial comprises both sides presenting
their arguments. This being so it was sensible to look at ideas about argumentation
from Informal Logic. This led to the notion of argumentation schemes, first that of
Toulmin [123], and later the schemes proposed by Walton [131]. Also in the mid-
90s the notion of abstract argumentation [55] emerged, and this too had an important
influence on AI and Law [22]. An additional influence was Pollock [95], particularly
in identifying different types of attack. A further development is the exploration of
structured arguments to be evaluated using abstract frameworks. Ways of representing
the structure include ASPIC+ [97] and Carneades [62]. We will discuss explanations
based on the schemes of Toulmin and Walton and abstract argumentation frameworks
in this section, and ASPIC+ and Carneades in section 6.2, although it should be noted
that both make considerable use of argument schemes in generating their arguments..
5.1. Toulmin
One idea to improve explanation from legal systems was to provide an argument
structured according to the argumentation scheme of Stephen Toulmin [123]. Indepen-
dent proposals to use this scheme can be found in [83] and [85]. The idea in all three
cases was that presenting the arguments using this structure would assist non-logicians,
such as lawyers and jurors, to understand the argument. Toulmin’s structure is shown
in Figure 2.
Toulmin’s scheme recognises the different roles of statements in an argument:
• Claim: The conclusion of the argument;
• Qualifier: The strength of the claim (certainly, probably, possibly, etc);
• Data: The premises of the argument;
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Figure 2: Toulmin’s Argumentation Scheme
• Warrant: The inference rule allowing the claim to be inferred from the data;
• Backing: The source of the warrant (in law: statute, case, commentary etc);
• Rebuttal: A reason why the claim might be though false, or the warrant inappli-
cable.
Important advantages of the scheme in the legal context are that it incorporates the
authority for the warrant, and that it recognises the defeasibile nature of legal reason-
ing by including a rebuttal component which, if true, will block the conclusion. The
rebuttal also supports contrastive explanations.
A computable version of the scheme was provided in [29] which executed an anno-
tated logic program to generate a set of relations instantiating the reasoning as Toulmin
argument schemes (e.g. [claim, arg1, findFrorPlaintiff], [data, arg1, private], [backing,
arg1, Keeble], etc). The annotation also excluded certain obvious tests (e.g. 75 > 60)
from the explanation, supporting an element of selectivity. Given a suitably annotated
version of the rules from section 4, this would give the explanation of Young as:
The argument for the plaintiff is that he captured the animal because he
had control and was pursuing his livelihood. This is following Keeble.
However, this can be rebutted since the defendant was in competition with
the plaintiff.
There is no other argument for the Plaintiff.
The explanation presents first the data, then the backing and finally the rebuttal.
Warrants were generally omitted, since that the claim followed from the data was con-
sidered implicit and so not worth mentioning. Thus the explanation exhibits a degree of
selectivity. A more sophisticated presentation of explanations based on this approach
was given in [34]. A method for exploring the structure through a dialogue was given
in [26], which will be discussed along with other dialogical methods below.
5.2. Other schemes
Throughout the 90s, Toulmin’s scheme was the only one prominently used in AI
and Law. Around the turn of the century, however, the idea, derived from Walton
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[131], of using a variety of schemes to represent different kinds of argument (such as
Argument from Expert Opinion, Argument from Negative Consequences, Argument
from Rules, etc) was introduced into AI and Law [127]. Argumentation schemes can
be seen as a generalisation of the rules of inference. Walton’s insight, stemming from
his work on fallacies, was to see that certain rules of inference which are, in general,
fallacious, may be able to ground presumptively valid inferences provided they are
able to satisfy a number of critical questions. Thus although given P→ Q and Q it
is strictly fallacious to infer P, this inference could be presumptively acceptable if no
other reason for Q can be shown.
The use of argumentation schemes in law was discussed in [64], where the authors
identified five schemes for legal reasoning:




• from testimonial evidence
Other work used a particular scheme to enable value based argumentation [67], or
several schemes ([137] and [103]) to articulate the reasoning of HYPO and CATO.
Another approach was that of Grabmair [66], who used a number of argument schemes
to express his value judgement formalism for representing legal argumentation.
For our example we will show how the use of schemes can better capture the reason-
ing in reaching a decision, explaining not only in terms of previous cases, but in terms
of the rationales for those decisions. Thus we may argue for the defendant in Young
using an argument from authority (a specialisation of position to know to ground an
argument from rule (R1 in this instance):
Justinian is an authority in this area of law. He said that capture required
bodily possession. The plaintiff did not have bodily possession of the fish,
and so has not established ownership through capture
One of the critical questions characteristic of the argument from authority is whether
other authorities disagree. Thus the plaintiff can argue:
Barbeyrac is an an authority of this area of law. He denied that bodily
possession was necessary to constitute capture.
The defendant can now produce an argument from case to establish the preference:
Justinian and Barbeyrac were considered in Pierson v Post. The defendant
won, showing Justinian was preferred. Therefore the Defendant should
win in Young.
Several complete reconstructions of the wild animal cases using argumentation are
given in a special issue of Artificial Intelligence and Law: [20], [98] and [65].
16
5.3. Abstract Argumentation
As well as the opportunities for structured argumentation offered by argumentation
schemes, during the late 90s the notion of abstract argumentation became increasingly
popular. Abstract argumentation derives from the work of Dung [55] and was intro-
duced to AI and Law in [96].
The key notion in [55] is that of an Argumentation Framework (AF). An argumen-
tation Framework comprises a pair < X ,R >, where X is a set of arguments, and R
is a set of attack relations between them. In [55] attacks always succeed, so that an
attacked argument is acceptable only if none of its attackers are accepted. From this
it is possible to identify subsets S of X such that every argument attacking a member
of S is attacked by a member of S. If S is also conflict free (no member S is attacked
by a member of S), then S is said to be admissible. That is, S represents a consistent
position, a set of arguments which can be consistently held and which can counter all
objections to their members. If an admissible set it maximal it is said to be a preferred
extension4. Properties of preferred extensions include that there is always at least one
preferred extension (possibly the empty set), but that there may be several preferred
extensions. For example, if the AF comprises just two mutually attacking arguments,
each will form a preferred extension: either can be accepted, but not both. Multiple
preferred extensions arise when the AF contains one or more cycles of even length
([18], Theorem 2.6).
If we now represent a legal dispute as an AF, then if there is a single preferred
extension, then there will be a single clear winner. If, however, there are multiple
preferred extensions, then different positions are tenable: this will typically be the case
in a legal dispute. Disagreements as to facts always yield two-cycles, but even when
the facts are agreed, there can be disagreement on interpretation and points of law. In
[17], the wild animals cases (our three example cases, plus several additional cases)
were modelled as an argumentation framework, as shown in Figure 3.
The contents of each argument are not important here, but the plaintiff wins if and
only if argument A is in the preferred extension. In fact there are multiple preferred ex-
tensions, some with A and some without, arising from the presence of two even length
cycles. The two-cycle M-O concerns whether or not Justinian provides an authority
that should be followed, and is capable of different resolutions in different jurisdictions
or at different times. In the actual series of cases, Pierson v Post decided that Justinian
should be followed, although the contrary was argued in the minority opinion. The
other important cycle, T -S-E-B concerns an allegation of unfair competition (argument
T ) which arose in Young v Hitchens. In practice, the cycle was broken by the court
deciding that it could not rule on what constituted unfair competition (argument U),
but otherwise there would have been a dilemma: if we accept that the competition was
unfair (T ) we will also accept E (that Young had done enough to establish possession)
and Young will win. Alternatively we can accept the other two arguments in the cycle
and Hitchens will win.
The explanation afforded by these systems is of the disagreement between the
4There are many different acceptability semantics for AFs. Three, grounded, preferred and stable are
given in [55], but in subsequent years, many more have been proposed. See [14] for a survey.
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Figure 3: Argumentation Framework for wild animals cases from [17]
plaintiff and defendant. The AF is able to identify the cycles and thus present the
source of the disagreement, and the consequences of adopting the different positions.
Although this does explain the source of disagreement, it does not explain why the
disagreement was settled one way rather than another. In order to address this Value
Based Argumentation Frameworks (VAF) [18] were used. This approach was used in
[19] and [25]. Here the arguments are associated with values (as discussed in 4.3).
Now the choice of preferred extension can be explained in terms of value preferences.
The AF for Young from [19] is shown in Figure 4.
The framework adopts some of the arguments from Keeble interpreted as allow-
ing that Keeble owned the ducks through capture, since his activity was economically
useful and he had control of the animals, but adds for Young arguments I, J and K.
In practice argument K settles the matter (given that the role of the court is more im-
portant than considerations of economic usefulness), but in its absence, the plaintiff
would win since argument A is defeated whatever the value order (if clarity is pre-
ferred to economically useful, then B defeats A, otherwise H defeats A). Thus using
VAFs not only identifies disagreements, but can also explain the decisions in terms of
value preferences.
5.4. Using Abstract Dialectical Frameworks
Abstract Dialectical Frameworks (ADFs) [44] are a generalisation of abstract ar-
gumentation frameworks. ADFs are formed by a three tuple: a set of nodes, a set of
directed links joining pairs of nodes (a parent node and its child nodes), and a set of
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Figure 4: Value Based Argumentation Framework for Young from [19]
acceptance conditions, expressed in terms of the children. The links show which nodes
are used to determine the acceptability (or otherwise) of any particular node, so that
the acceptability of a parent node is determined solely by its children.
ADFs have been applied in law to model factor-based reasoning in a number of
domains [2] [4]. Used in the legal context, the ADFs’ nodes represent statements,
which relate to the issues, intermediate factors and base level factors found in CATO’s
factor hierarchies. The acceptance conditions provide a set of individually sufficient
and jointly necessary conditions for the parent node to be accepted or rejected. For leaf
nodes, acceptance and rejection is determined by the user, on the basis of the facts of
the particular legal case being considered. Collectively, the acceptance conditions can
been seen as a knowledge base and they are a feature that provides the modularisation,
which is important for being able to easily modify and update the domain knowledge
captured in an ADF as the law evolves [1]. Furthermore, the acceptance conditions are
used to generate arguments and the ADF structure guides their deployment.
In [3] a methodology for capturing case law (ANGELIC) was presented and it
was shown how the CATO trade secrets cases, the automobile exception the the 4th
amendment, and the wild animals cases discussed previously can be represented as
ADFs. Once defined for a domain, an ADF can easily be transformed into a logic
program that, when instantiated with the facts of a case, can determine outcome for the
case and the acceptable arguments leading to this decision. The programs reported in
[3] demonstrated a high degree of success in replicating the outcomes from the cases
used in the experiments, yielding a success rate of over 96% accuracy.
Furthermore, the programs provide output that is highly transparent since they iden-
tify precisely the path of reasoning followed through the ADF hierarchy to reach a
conclusion on an issue. Below is the output for the case of Young, as taken from [3].:
?- go(young).
the plaintiff had not captured the quarry
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the plaintiff did not own the quarry
plaintiff has good motive
defendant has good motive
plaintiff did not own the land
plaintiff had a right to pursue the quarry
defendant committed no antisocial acts
defendant committed no trespass
no illegal act was committed
do not find for the plaintiff
find for the defendant young
[rtToPursue,dMotive,pMotive,nc,hp,imp,pliv,dliv]
The list of labels given in the final line of the output above are internal names for
nodes accepted in the ADF representation of the Young case.
In [3] it was also discussed how the programs’ output could be built into a more
human-oriented explanation. To do this, some re-ordering of the nodes examined was
required, along with the addition of some linking text and customisation to refer to
issues and base level factors used to invoke a particular clause (as was done in [34]).
This yields the following as a sample of what such an explanation could look like
for our running example Young; clauses from the program output are given in boldface,
possible text for issues and base level factors are in italics and linking text is in ordinary
font.
We find for the defendant. The plaintiff did not own the quarry. The
plaintiff had not achieved ownership through capture because the plaintiff
had not captured the quarry and although the plaintiff was in hot pursuit
and plaintiff has good motive, defendant has good motive also. Plaintiff
did not acquire ownership through ownership of the land because Plain-
tiff did not own the land. Plaintiff did not achieve ownership through
violated right to pursue because although plaintiff had a right to pursue
the quarry, defendant committed no antisocial acts, defendant com-
mitted no trespass and no illegal act was committed.
The representation in [3] is somewhat more detailed than our earlier examples and
includes a third issue (violated right to pursue), which arose in a later case but did not
feature in Pierson, Keeble or Young.
To move the work described above into real world applications, a feasibility study
was conducted in collaboration with a large law firm to build a practical system us-
ing ANGELIC [4]. A body of case law relevant for the business, claims for noise
induced hearing loss against employers, was captured as an ADF using the ANGELIC
methodology. In this study, identification of useable arguments was crucial to guide
case handlers in assessing the strength of a claim and whether or not it had reasonable
prospect of defence. The use of ADFs in this task was demonstrated to be highly effec-
tive in modelling the domain and assisting case handlers in identifying the arguments
relevant for deciding the cases. More recently, this body of work has been extended
to examine how ANGELIC can be used to handle reasoning about factors with mag-
20
nitude [11], as well as Boolean factors, and we see this as a promising area for future
development of practical decision-support tools with transparent explanation features.
6. Interactive Explanation
The desire to include selective and social elements led to interest in the use of in-
teractive explanations through dialogues. Another attempt to improve the presentation
of explanations was through the use of visualisations.
6.1. Dialogue Games
During the 90s dialogue games became very popular in AI and Law, e.g. [61], [71],
[81], [101] and [16]. A robust implemented system was described in [128]. In the
main these systems were designed to allow an adversarial discussion between the two
parties, one represented by the computer and one by the user. Social aspects were of
particular importance here: there was a recognition that a properly conducted legal case
must follow a certain procedure. The modelling of one such procedure was the main
motivation of [61]. Such systems did not really explain the reasoning: the users were
either expected to come to an understanding of the situation by seeing their arguments
met, as in e.g. [101] and [10], or to interactively construct the winning argument which
would thus explain the outcome, e.g. [128].
There were, however, approaches which provided not an adversarial persuasion
dialogue, but an explanatory dialogue, intended to explain the results of a previous
computation. One such dialogue was used in [26] to explain the result established by
the production of an argument based on Toulmin’s scheme. In this system the user
was presented with the claim, and then could use questions to navigate the structure by
asking questions appropriate to the current location. For example, when presented with
the claim, one could ask for the data (why?), the warrant (because?), or the possible
rebuttal (unless?). From the warrant, one could move to the data (in this case?), class
(presupposing?), or backing (on account of?).
So the explanation of the Toulmin based argument in 5.1. would yield the following
dialogue (with C as the computer and U the user):
[C] The plaintiff has captured the animal
[U] Why?
[C] The plaintiff had control and was pursuing his livelihood
[U] So?
[C] If the plaintiff had control and was pursuing his livelihood he is deemed to have
captured the animal
[U] On account of?
[C] The rule was established in Keeble
[U] Unless?
[C] The defendant was in competition with the plaintiff
This mode of explanation supports selectivity in particular. Users need only request
the elements of which they are unaware. For example, a user familiar with Keeble will
see that the facts of the current case match the precedent when presented with the data,
and so will move straight to the rebuttal.
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6.2. Visualisation
We have seen in section 5.3 how diagrammatic representations can support expla-
nation in abstract argumentation frameworks, but diagrams are also widely used for
structured explanation.
Although the diagrammatic presentations of Toulmin’s argumentation scheme of
the sort shown in Figure 2 were exploited in the early work on Toulmin in [83] and [85],
and an alternative proposal for visualisation was given in [82], visualising arguments
was greatly popularised by the development of a general purpose tool for argument di-
agramming, ARAUCARIA [104]. As well as its own standard format, ARAUCARIA
supported Toulmin’s scheme and also that of Wigmore, who had developed a diagram-
matic notation for legal cases [135] used in e.g. [125].
A number of visualisations for AI and Law have been developed. The dialogue in
[128] was presented visually, and diagrams based on ASPIC+ [97] have been used in
a variety of contexts, e.g. [103] and [99]. Perhaps the leading example of software
intended for the visualisation of legal arguments is, however, Carneades [62]. This sys-
tem presents arguments as a tree which layers claims, their arguments and the premises
of these arguments. These diagrams become quite large for complex problems, but
the graph taken from [63] relating to why Post did not have possession of the fox in
Pierson v Post is shown in Figure 5. Carneades is a highly sophisticated system which
draws heavily on the notion of argumentation schemes and currently makes 106 pre-
programmed schemes available to ts users [132]5. The system works by instantiating
these schemes from a knowledge base containing facts relating to the case.
In the example in Figure 5, the claim of argument a2 is that Post did not have
possession of the fox. Argument a2 is an argument from rule (see section 5.2 for the
argument schemes used by Gordon and Walton). Effectively the rule used is R3 from
section 4. The rule itself is justified by three independent arguments from authority, all
of which claim that pursuit alone is not sufficient to establish possession.
7. Explaining Machine Learning
Until very recently the use of machine learning in AI and Law to make and predict
decisions was limited, primarily because the explanation facilities were unsatisfactory.
The prevalent view was similar to that recently expressed by Robbins:
“the explanations given by explicable AI are only fruitful if we already
know which considerations are acceptable for the decision at hand. If we
already have these considerations, then there is no need to use contempo-
rary AI algorithms because standard automation would be available. In
other words, a principle of explicability for AI makes the use of AI redun-
dant. ... The real object in need of the property of ‘requiring explicability’
is the result of the process—not the process itself. ... Knowing that a
specific decision requires an explanation (e.g. declining a loan applica-
tion) gives us good reason not to use opaque AI (e.g. machine learning)
5CARNEADES is publicly available at https://github.com/carneades. Last accessed 22nd July, 2020
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Figure 5: Carneades Explanation of why Post did not have possession, using three Arguments from Authority
to ground an argument from rule taken from [63] and annotated to show the various layers.
for that decision. Any decision requiring an explanation should not be
made by machine learning (ML) algorithms. Automation is still an option;
however, this should be restricted to the old-fashioned kind of automation
whereby the considerations are hard-coded into the algorithm. ” [110].
Essentially the argument was that in order to provide a satisfactory explanation
that a domain user could understand, it would be necessary to do the sort of analysis
required to build a case or rule based system, so as to identify the terms to use in the
explanation. Without such analysis, the explanation would not make sense to the user.
As an example, consider [5] a machine learning based prediction system for cases in
the European Court of Human Rights which offered by way of explanation “the 20
most frequent words, listed in order of their SVM [Support Vector Machine] weight”.
One such list, for topic 23 of article 6 predicting violation, is:
court, applicant, article, judgment, case, law, proceeding, application, gov-
ernment, convention, time, article convention, January, human, lodged,
domestic, February, September, relevant, represented
The terms do not look to provide a readily acceptable explanation: some like
“court” and “law” one would see as likely to be present in any decision, while oth-
ers, such as the names of months would appear to be artefacts of the dataset. These are
not the terms that a conventional analysis would be likely to identify. But if the analysis
to perform a satisfactory explanation has to be undertaken anyway, the construction of
a standard case based or rule based system would be the most sensible way to use it.
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The analysis remains, however, a substantial, and often daunting task, Therefore
researchers working on AI and Law did explore the use of machine learning, but always
recognising that it would be necessary to justify the predictions in terms that could be
understood by lawyers and laypeople. Because of the importance of explanation some
have proposed hybrid systems, to exploit the strengths offered by machine learning for
prediction and explicit representation for explanation [41], [42].
7.1. Past Explanations of Machine Learning
One way in which machine learning techniques were used was to discover rules. In
the early 90s neural networks enjoyed a significant amount of popularity, and appeared
to be able to produce a very high quality performance on problems which were not
well understood. The use of neural networks in law was investigated in [15] and [68].
In [15], to avoid the need for careful analysis to identify relevant features, the dataset
used 64 attributes of which only 12 were relevant, to investigate whether the system
could learn in the face of this irrelevant information. It was demonstrated that excellent
results could be achieved on a legal problem. On a random training set, a success rate
of around 98% was achieved. From the trained net, however, investigation revealed that
only four of the six conditions that were required to be satisfied were considered, and
the high degree of success resulted from multiple conditions being failed. Tested on
data which failed only one condition, the success rate fell to around 75%. This paper
showed, therefore that a successful model did not necessarily mean that there was a
good understanding of the domain which could be used to explain the predictions.
If, however, the net could be trained on a dataset which contained passing cases and
failing cases that failed on exactly one of the six conditions, good performance could
be achieved and all six conditions identified to some extent. Selecting such a dataset
would, however, require an understanding of the domain that would be sufficient to
permit more traditional techniques to be used.
Other machine learning approaches attempted to extract rules which could be ex-
ecuted using either a standard rule based system or an argumentation based system.
Techniques for rule discovery included inductive logic programming (e.g. [91]) and
data mining for association rules (e.g. [133]). Both of these papers used the same
dataset as [15]. In [91] the set of rules extracted were compared with the six “ideal”
rules. The experiment showed that using CN2 [52] a high level of performance (99%)
could be achieved with a defective set of rules. As with the neural net experiment four
conditions were correctly identified, also one was partially identified and one was en-
tirely wrongly identified. Using a version of CN2 augmented by argumentation based
on an expert’s explanation of misclassified data (ABCN2 [91]), the rules could be re-
fined, ending with four correct, one still partial, but far more complete, and one using
the right features, but with a threshold of 735 rather than 750. This suggests that in a
situation where the rules are unknown, a reasonable approximation could be achieved
using ABCN2. These rules could then be deployed in a standard rule based system,
and explain the reasoning using the usual facilities. Note, however, this does require
the participation of an expert with a good understanding of the domain.
In [133] association rules were refined through a dialogue with moves based on
case based reasoning systems such as CATO [6] (including cite, distinguish, counter
example, and unwanted consequences of a rule). During the course of the dialogue the
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rule would be refined so that when the dialogue was complete the winning rule was
available to justify and explain the outcome,
Another use of machine learning was the SMILE system [8]. The purpose of
SMILE was to enable a pipeline from a natural language description of a case to an
outcome. SMILE was based on the domain analysis of CATO [6], which had identified
the factors as relevant to the outcome. CATO had identified 26 of these factors, and
SMILE identified a separate classifier for each of these factors using a combination of
shallow parsing, information extraction, and machine learning techniques. Now given
a textual description of a case (a “squib”6) SMILE could say whether each of these
factors was present or absent, and so provide the cases in the form required by IBP
(described in section 4.2 above). The outcome could then be predicted using the IBP
system. The machine learning aspect here was not entirely successful: while IBP can
achieve better than 90% accuracy on manually ascribed factors, this falls to around
70% when the factors are assigned using SMILE.
What these early experiments showed was that while it was often possible to achieve
a good level of performance using machine learning techniques, the rationales for the
predictions (and hence the explanations) were often unsatisfactory. Although the qual-
ity of the rationales could be improved by expert intervention (selecting the most in-
formative training cases in [15] and explaining misclassified cases in [91]), the effort
involved was not dissimilar to that required to analyse the domain for building a knowl-
edge based system.
In all these approaches machine learning was given an intermediate role. Since the
system used by the end user only used a product of the machine learning, explanation
was not an issue for the end user, although the deficiencies in the knowledge captured
by the system definitely was. It should also be noted that all the experiments referred
to above, the size of the dataset was, by today’s standards, rather small, using hundreds
rather than thousands of cases. Currently the use of machine learning in AI and Law is
enjoying a significant revival profiting from the widespread availability of large sets of
cases and improvements in machine learning techniques. Examples are: [5], [47], and
[88]. We will now look at explainability for such systems.
8. Future Directions
In this article, we have so far discussed various ways that have been used in ex-
isting AI-based legal systems to provide explanations at various levels. Compared to
the earlier systems that used association rules and/or a limited set of human-engineered
features, modern-day machine-learnt AI and Law systems automatically derive salient
features from massive data collections in natural language using deep learning tech-
niques and so pose a complex set of challenges with regard to explainability, which we
will discuss in this section.
6A squib is a very brief rendition of a single case or a single point of law from a case in a legal casebook,
25
8.1. Deep Learning
Deep learning [59] is a collection of representation learning methods that can auto-
matically learn salient features for a particular task from a given data collection. In clas-
sical supervised machine learning algorithms such as support vector machines [126], a
human domain expert must first manually specify salient features for a given task, and
the learning algorithm will come up with an appropriately weighted and possibly non-
linear combination of those features that can make accurate predictions. The weight
associated with a feature can be used as a proxy for determining the importance of that
feature for making predictions [93]. This first step of manual specification of salient
features is known as feature engineering and is often a bottleneck due to multiple rea-
sons such as the cost or unavailability of domain experts and the limited coverage of
pre-defined features. Consequently, deep learning methods have gained popularity be-
cause they obviate the need for manual feature engineering. Moreover, state-of-the-art
performance on a broad range of classification/recognition tasks have been achieved
such as in image classification [139], machine translation [56], textual entailment [80]
and relation extraction [13] using deep learning methods. Within the legal domain, as
well as the outcome prediction systems mentioned above, deep learning-based systems
have been proposed for predicting the length of prison sentences [48], detecting med-
ical negligence [37] and extracting information from handwritten documents [122].
8.2. Challenges
Although the ability to automatically learn useful representations for a given set
of inputs without any human intervention is a strong advantage of the deep learning-
based legal AI systems, it also brings several significant challenges in terms of explain-
ability. Because the features are no longer manually specified, it is difficult to know
what features are used by the deep learnt model for making predictions. For exam-
ple, automatically learnt word representations using deep learning approaches such as
word2vec [89] and Global Vector Prediction (GloVe) [94] have shown to encode un-
fair discriminative gender and racial biases [142, 39]. For example, the pre-trained
word embeddings predict homemaker for the verbal analogy, man is to programmer
vs. women is to ?, which maximises the relational similarity between the two word-
pairs: (man, programmer), (woman, homemaker). It is common practice to use such
pre-trained word embeddings to represent input texts in natural language processing
(NLP) applications to improve performance. However, doing so makes those NLP sys-
tems biased with regard to legally protected attributes such as gender [112]. Although
there have been recent attempts to debias pre-trained word embeddings [75], it has been
reported that not all biases are accurately removed by the existing methods [58].
The implications of this problem is particularly worrying in the legal domain be-
cause legal decisions must be devoid of any such discriminative biases. Although it is
acceptable, for example, to classify sentiment or detect human faces using any available
feature in the training data, when it comes to legal decision making we must ensure that
the features used by a machine learning-based system are based on existing laws and
principles of natural justice. Because deep learning-based methods learn representa-
tions automatically from the training data, there is no guarantee that those features will
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be based on or related to any laws. Unfortunately historic legal data will always be sus-
pect, because bias has been found in a number of instances [47]. It is always important
that we do not ossify discredited social attitudes that were formerly prevalent.
8.3. Potential Solutions
Attention [12] is a widely used technique for providing explanations into decisions
made by deep learning-based models. Specifically, attention is a normalised weight
that is learnt that selects a subset of features conditioned on a given training instance.
It has been shown that attention weights provide useful insights into the decisions made
by machine learning-based systems in various application areas [140, 92, 111]. In Evi-
dence Based Medicine, attention has been used to select sequences of texts from scien-
tific papers that provide evidence for a particular medical procedure or a diagnosis [78].
However, it has been shown that attention alone is inadequate as a form of explanation
especially when the number of layers in a deep neural network increases and multiple
nonlinear activation functions are used after an attention layer [116, 134].
Branting et al. [43], [42] used Hierarchical Attention Networks (HANs) for predict-
ing the outcomes of World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) domain name
dispute cases. These cases have only two possible decisions: granting or denying the
request to transfer a domain name to the Complainant, and can be considered as a bi-
nary classification problem, given a dispute case. HANs were originally proposed for
providing explanation for the predictions made by document classifiers. Specifically,
HANs use bi-directional gated recurrent units (GRUs) [49] over pre-trained static word
embeddings and concatenate the forward and backward hidden states for each token
as a contextualised word representation. Next, sentence embeddings are created as the
linearly-weighted sum of the word representations obtained in the previous step, where
attention scores are used as the weights. Similar to the way sentence embeddings were
created using word embeddings, a second bi-directional GRU is applied over sentence
embeddings to create the final embedding for the document. Specifically, each sen-
tence embedding is multiplied by an attention weight that indicates its contribution to
the overall meaning of the document and then those weighted sentence embeddings
are added up. Because of this two-level (word-level and sentence-level) attention, this
model is known as a hierarchical attention network. However, it has been shown that
highlighting salient words in legal documents alone does not significantly help to re-
duce the time required to make legal decisions [43]. Often one must read relevant
prior cases and cite those as justifications for a legal decision. For this purpose, Brant-
ing et al. [43] proposed a semi-supervised approach where they automatically annotate
WIPO domain name dispute cases with prior cases with decisions, by measuring the
semantic similarity between sentences. We identify attention as a potential future re-
search direction for providing explanations into legal decisions made by deep learning
systems.
Providing similar past cases as evidence for a legal decision is a commonly used
practice in legal prosecution, and was the basis of the approaches discussed in section
3. If a particular decision is made on a similar case in the past, then following the legal
precedence, we must be consistent with our decisions for similar future cases. In ma-
chine learning terms this can be formulated as a problem of finding similar past cases
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with the same decision as we have predicted for the case that we are currently consider-
ing. Supervised classification algorithms such as the k-nearest neighbour classifiers and
case-based reasoning systems are operating on this principle. A recent example using
deep neural networks is reported in [124]. However, deep learning-based classifiers are
known to be highly sensitive to adversarial examples [120], instances that are carefully
perturbed with noise, for which contradictory predictions are made by the deep learnt
classifier despite their being no difference that can be noticed by the naked human eye.
For example, Goodfellow et al. [60] showed that given an image of a panda, correctly
classified by a deep neural network with 57% confidence, we can perturb it with noise
that is insignificant to the human naked eye to make the network predict a gibbon with
99% confidence. The implication of this for a legal decision making system is worrying
to say the least. We can end up making decisions due to legally irrelevant minor fea-
tures or find cases that are not at all legally apposite to support our decisions. Because
neural networks are making distributed decisions where a large number of weights in
the network are multiplied by the features present in a given instance and summed up
and a prediction is made depending on whether this weighted-sum exceeds a threshold
or not, we can find adversarial examples that are significantly different in the feature
space but result in similar weighted-sums. Adversarial examples have been used to in-
crease the robustness of deep learning systems [60] and we believe that future research
in this topic will enable us to design more interpretable and robust prediction systems.
Compared to sub-symbolic approaches such as deep neural nets, symbolic methods
are easier to interpret and generate explanations in the form of inference chains. Com-
bining the reasoning capabilities of logic-based symbolic systems and prediction capa-
bilities of deep neural networks7 to develop hybrid systems is a hotly debated on going
topic8. Deep learning pioneers such as Yoshua Bengio have strongly argued against hy-
brid systems proposed by cognitive scientist and the author of Reboot AI Gary Marcus
claiming that future research in deep learning will be able to provide deep neural nets
that can perform inference, making symbolic approaches obsolete. However, at least
for the short-term, such hybrid approaches are likely to provide explanations to the
decisions made by deep learnt legal prediction systems. For example, Mao et al. [84]
proposed a Neuro-Symbolic Concept Learner (NS-CL) that learns representations for
visual objects and sentences using neural networks and translates the sentences into ex-
ecutable, symbolic programmes. A neuro-symbolic reasoning module executes these
programs in the learnt latent representation space. Because the representational space
is continuous, it can be used to easily generalise to previously unseen objects, over-
coming the knowledge acquisition bottleneck associated with symbolic approaches.
NS-CL shows impressive performance on visual question answering and bidirectional
image-text retrieval tasks. There are, however, no examples of this technique being
applied to legal prediction.
Although the various machine learning techniques have shown promise and will
doubtless attract further research within AI and Law, currently none are able to produce
7This approach was tried in AI and Law using standard neural networks in [141], but this line of research
was not further pursued at that time.
8https://montrealartificialintelligence.com/aidebate/
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explanations of a comparable standard to the knowledge engineered systems we have
discussed. Explanation is an essential feature of legal systems intended to predict case
outcomes and so it is crucial that this aspect be developed for machine learning systems
intended for deployment on such tasks.
9. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have described the various traditional methods for explaining the
reasoning of systems in AI and Law. Despite a recent upturn in interest in machine
learning methods, such as [5], [47], [43] and [88], doubts remain about the quality of
explanation produced by such systems without the guidance of human experts. There-
fore traditional methods continue to be pursued in the development of practical systems
[4], and methodologies to support such systems continue to be developed [3]. The im-
portance of, indeed the necessity for, explanations in legal systems, means that this
issue cannot be ignored, and without confidence in the explanation, justice cannot be
seen to be done.
One feature of legal systems that does ease the task of traditional systems is that in
law, although there may be many of thousands of cases available, it is usually unneces-
sary to consider many of these. Very high performing systems have been constructed on
the basis of a limited number of cases: to consider some AI and Law classics: HYPO
used fewer than 30 cases [7], CATO used 148 [6], IBP used 186 [45], and reasonable
theories have been developed for the wild animals domain with only half a dozen (e.g.
[3]). Whereas in machine learning authority comes from the number of cases, in law
the level of court, status of the judge, quality of the argument and being followed in
subsequent cases are what confer authority. Moreover identifying the leading decisions
is not difficult. Although transcripts of all judgements may be available only a small
percentage9 are reported and so available for use in subsequent cases. Of these, only
those with important legal significance will be used in subsequent cases. Leading cases
can therefore be readily identified and will typically be well known to domain experts.
Often they are consolidated in handbooks such as [74] which covers UK tort law. This
means that a knowledge engineer can focus on cases that are regarded as significant
and ignore the vast majority of cases which may, in any case, include examples where
the law was imperfectly implied, which has led to bias in some AI and law machine
learning systems [47]. This focus means that it is quite possible to develop practical
systems for specific areas of law (e.g.[4]).
Nevertheless the use of powerful machine learning techniques does have its at-
tractions in law, and they will continue to have a significant role in specific areas in
which, unlike prediction of decisions, explanation is of lesser importance. For example
machine learning has shown to be valuable for the tasks involved in e-discovery [53]
and contract review, which can be done by commercially available tools such as Kira
Systems10. Research will continue also on improving the explanation of prediction
9Around 2%. https://ox.libguides.com/c.php?g=422832\&p=2887381. Last accessed
22nd July 2020.
10https://kirasystems.com/. Last accessed 22nd July 2020.
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systems. However, this facet is of such importance in law that it is essential that the
explanations they provide are at least as good as those currently available from systems
built from expert knowledge of the domain.
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